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the insurance policy and no insurable interest in the deceased. The
defendant has the truck in return for the agreed consideration of
paying the debt he assumed. At the same time, the insured's estate
receives what he bargained for-the debt on the property has been
paid by the defendant as he agreed to do. In concluding that the
estate was entitled to subrogation, the court said:
If such payment by the insurer were allowed to cancel the pri-
mary defendant debtor's obligation, under the assumption agree-
ment .. . the defendant, the primary debtor, would in effect be
made a beneficiary although he has no insurable interest in the
life of the insured. On the other hand, if the creditor . . . were
given an absolute right to the proceeds, independent of the debt
involved, the public policy limiting it to indemnification would be
contravened .... 20
If the two above mentioned factors are policy considerations in
reaching the result in Hatley, the court should reconsider the valid-
ity of the doctrine in Miller v. Potter"' that refused to allow subro-
gation against the assuming mortgagor when the creditor paid the
premiums for insurance on the surety's life.22
DAVID S. ORCUTT
Labor Relations-Federal Pre-emption of Defamation Cases
The Supreme Court has held that libel and slander suits can be
entertained by the courts even though the same activity is argu-
ably subject to NLRB cognizance under the Labor Management
Relations Act.' In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers' an assis-
tant general manager brought a libel action alleging that during an
organizational campaign the union circulated defamatory leaflets
20265 N.C. at 84, 143 S.E.2d at 268.
21210 N.C. 268, 186 S.E. 350 (1936).
22 The problem in the instant case probably could have been avoided if
the parties had notified the creditor of the transfer. The General Motors
Acceptance Corporation Group Creditors policy provides that "Any person
who succeeds any such debtor under and by Transfer of Equity accepted
and approved by the Creditor, shall be eligible from the acceptance and ap-
proval of such transfer." Letter From Fred R. Gibney to David S. Orcutt,
September 30, 1966. (Mr. Gibney is Director of Group Claims for Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America.)
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) [hereinafter cited
as LMRA] 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1965).2 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
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falsely accusing management of lying both to the NLRB and to
the employees thereby depriving certain employees of their right
to vote in NLRB elections. The district court dismissed on the
grounds that defamation actions arising out of a labor dispute were
pre-empted by the LMRA, and the court of appeals affirmed.3 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that courts have jurisdiction to
apply state remedies in defamation actions arising out of an organi-
zational campaign provided that the statements were made with
malice and caused injury to the plaintiff. The Court did not deal
with constitutional issues, but directed its opinion solely to the ex-
tent to which state remedies are pre-empted by the LMRA.4
In order to determine the competency of states to regulate libel
and slander in a labor dispute context,5 the Court looked for author-
ity in a score of pre-emption cases it had handed down in the past
fifteen years. The leading case of Garner v. Teamsters Union' held
that where the activity obviously fell within the NLRB's jurisdic-
tion to prevent unfair labor practices, the state through its courts
could not adjudge the same controversy and extend its own form
of remedy. More important than the holding itself was the ap-
proach the Court took. The Court no longer concerned itself with
the merits of the case,' but directed itself solely to the problem of
8 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
'Two important areas where the LMRA itself specifically provides
against pre-emption are: suits for breach of a collective bargaining contract
under section 301(a), see Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962); and suits to enforce the state's prohibition against agency shop
agreements enacted under section 14(b), see Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Scher-
merhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
' Other courts which had faced the question had largely decided in favor
of pre-emption: Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (6th
Cir. 1964); Sullivan v. Day Publishing Co., 239 F. Supp. 677 (D. Conn.
1965); Hill v. Moe, 367 P.2d 739 (Alaska 1961); Local 150, Int'l. Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 2d 432, 39 Cal. Rep. 590 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389,
201 A.2d 46; Troidl v. Keough, 44 Misc. 2d 548, 254 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.
1964); Schnell Tool & Die Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 30 Ohio Op. 2d.
318, 200 N.E.2d 727 (C.P. 1964). Contra, Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d
445, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (dictum); Brantley
v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Meyer v. Joint Council
53, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d 382 (1965).
'Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). The Court held
that a state could not nejoin peaceful picketing as an unfair labor practice
even though the picketing had caused a ninety-five per cent loss of business
and violated both a state labor relations statute and state tort law.
'In early cases the Court took upon itself the task of determining the
merits of an alleged unfair labor practice. International Union v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
federal-state relations under the actY The breadth of the new ap-
proach became more apparent in 1955 with Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,' where the Court extended federal pre-emption to cover
all activity that could reasonably be deemed to come within the
prohibitions or protections afforded by the act. For several years
following Weber, the Court adhered to its test of reasonable appli-
cability of the act, but still found several situations where the state
authority had not been exclusively absorbed by the federal enact-
ment." The 1959 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon"
decision extended the pre-emption doctrine to its present proportions
and put to rest most of the elaborate distinctions which had devel-
oped around prior holdings. 2 The Court directed attention to the
single issue of whether the activity involved is "arguably subject to"
the protections of section 7 or the prohibitions of section 8 of the
act. Under this test, both federal and state courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the NLRB in all cases where an argument
could be made that the activity involved was subject to the pro-
visions of the LMRA.'5 Once the primary jurisdictional question
' Congressional pre-emption in favor of the NLRB prevents all courts,
even the Supreme Court, from exercising jurisdiction over matters covered
by the LMRA. "It is not necessary or appropriate for us to surmise how
the National Labor Relations Board might have decided this controversy
had petitioner presented it to that body. The power and duty of primary
decision lies with the Board, not with us." Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953).
- 348 U.S. 468 (1955). The Court held that the state was precluded from
regulating activities under a state anti-trust law where the complaint also
alleged an unfair labor practice under specific sections of the LMRA.
"°A state was allowed to award both actual and punitive damages under
a common law tort action for losses to an employer's business resulting
from violent activity clearly subject to the LMRA. United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). Actual and punitive
damages were again allowed against a union in International Union, UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), where an employee had been prevented
from going to work by the union's mass picketing and threats of violence.
And in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958),
a state court was allowed to award damages for lost wages as well as for
mental and physical suffering where the union had wrongfully expelled a
member. A state injunction was upheld to the extent that it enjoined acts
which had become emeshed with violence. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355
U.S. 131 (1957).
11359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12 The distinction most recognized among the courts was that a difference
in remedy was sufficient justification for resorting to state courts rather
than the NLRB. See, e.g., Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49
Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
" For a clear example of the application of this test see Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962), where it
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of whether the conduct called into question may reasonably be as-
serted to be subject to NLRB cognizance is decided in the affirma-
tive, state causes of action are totally precluded regardless of the
remedy sought. The pre-emption principle applies to damage
awards 4 as well as to injunctions,' 5 to state court proceedings 6 as
well as to regulation by a state agency,' 7 and to actions based upon
common law' s or statutes of general application 9 as well as to pro-
ceedings under a state labor relations statute."0
Although Garmon significantly enlarged the primary jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB,2 - it clearly established two exceptions to the
basic rule of pre-emption. If the activity regulated was a merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act,22 state
was argued that the picketing union was composed of marine engineers who
were supervisors rather than employees, and, therefore, the union was not a
"labor organization" within the definition of the LMRA. The Court found
that the activities were at least "arguably subject to" the act and pointed
out that the determination of that quesion was for the NLRB. Compare
Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S.
181 (1965) where the identical question was again presented, but the NLRB
had previously determined that the engineers were in fact supervisors and
not subject to the LMRA. Because of this prior determination, a reason-
able argument could not be made, and the state authority was upheld.
"Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701(1963); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690
(1963).
" Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Union v. Broadcast Service,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Hattisburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome,
377 U.S. 126 (1964).
"Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964);
Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
"Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
"Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701(1963). San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
(tort law and a specialized labor relations statute).
"
9 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), (restraint of
trade statute).
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
"Justice Frankfurter was careful to couch his reasoning in terms ofjudicial inability to cope with the peculiar and specialized problems inherent
in labor cases:
The nature of the judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into
the special problems of labor-management relations. . . . Nor is it
our business to attempt this. . . . To the National Labor Relations
Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely limited
demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and
administration.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).2 Id. at 243.
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law and remedies could be applied. Cited as representative was
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales13 but the court did
not suggest what types of activity other than arbitrary expulsion
from union membership would constitute a "merely peripheral con-
cern," and in two 1963 decisions, Local 100, United Ass'n of Jour-
neymen v. Borden 4 and Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers
v. Perko," the Court restricted the internal activities exception al-
most to the point of extinction. 26 Also excepted from the pre-
emption doctrine were "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States
of the power to act."'27 Prior to Linn, the only state interest found
compelling enough to allow state regulation, in spite of the fact
that the activity might also constitute an unfair labor practice, was
the regulation of intimidation, violence, and other threats to the
peace. The Garner-Weber-Garmon line of cases clearly recognized
that the state may exercise "its historic power over such traditional-
ly local matters as public safety and order and the use of the streets
and highways ' 2'8 by any method consistent with its police powers. 29
But except for situations earmarked by violence, the Court con-
tinued to pursue a policy of rigorous pre-emption of state inter-
2 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
"'Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690
(1963). The Court held that the state courts were pre-empted in an action
alleging that the union had unlawfully refused to refer the member to a job.
" Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701
(1963). The Court refused state court jurisdiction of an alleged tortious
conspiracy by the union and its officers resulting in the member's discharge
and prevention of his subsequent reemployment.
"' While the Court distinguished Borden and Perko from Gonzales on
the basis that Gonzales focused upon purely internal affairs and that Borden
and Perko focused more on the employment relationship, there is so much
similarity between all three cases that the practical effect is to restrict Gon-
.ales to its exact factual situation. Were Gonzales to be heard again today,
it is quite likely that the Garmon principles would limit the state jurisdiction
with respect to the awarding of consequential damages. See Local 100,
United Ass'n of journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 (1963).
2? San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
""Allen-Bradley Local 1111 UEW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942); quoted with approval in Garner v. Team-
sters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
" International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (damages
and punitive damages); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)
(injunction); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266
(1956) (administrative injunction); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (damages and punitive damages).
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vention into the labor field whether the regulation was applied
through injunction,8" damages,3' or criminal contempt sanctions.3 2
In Linn the Court added new vitality to the two exceptions and
expressly brought state defamation actions within the exceptions
recognized in Garmon33 The Court reasoned that state courts
handling libel suits deal with an interest entirely different from that
with which the NLRB deals. The Board is not interested in protect-
ing reputation or deterring violence; it looks only to the coercive or
misleading nature of the statements surrounded by other circum-
stances in order to determine an unfair labor practice charge, or
whether the employees had been so mislead that a fair election had
become impossible. Since the Board is unconcerned with the de-
famatory character of the statement, a judicial determination that
the statements were libelous in character would have no effect upon
the Board's jurisdiction over the merits of the labor dispute itself.
Thus the injury caused to an individual by a defamatory statement
is merely incidental to the Board's inquiry and the application of
state remedies would be a "merely peripheral concern of the Labor
Management Relations Act." 4
The Court further concluded that the states' concern with re-
dressing malicious libel is "so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility 'that an overriding state interest' . . . should be recog-
nized." 35 The traditional justification for libel actions, namely the
tendency of libel or slander to cause a breach of the peace,, is close-
ly related to the breach of the peace line of cases recognized in
Garmon. The Supreme Court itself has recognized maintenance of
the peace as one of the purposes of civil actions for libel." More-
over, the state is traditionally concerned with providing a peaceful
" Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Union v. Broadcast Service,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Hattiesburg Bldg. Trades Council v. Broome,
377 U.S. 126 (1964); Liner v. Jafco Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Local 438,
Constr. Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962).
1 E.g., Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701(1963); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690(1963).
" E.g., Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962). See also In re Green, 369
U.S. 689 (1962).
"' Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
"Id. at 61.
"Id. at 61.
"Id. at 64 n.6.
'* Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 68 (1964).
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forum to which individuals whose reputations have been damaged
by false and injurious statements can bring their claims. Balanced
against such meaningful state interests, the use of the known lie
as a tool has so little social utility that it should be afforded the
minimum protection consistent with national labor policy.
The Supreme Court was not oblivious to the potential conflict
in allowing defamation actions to coexist with our national regula-
tory scheme ;88 in fact, it specifically recognized that to allow these
actions as they presently exist would infringe upon national policy.
In an effort to accommodate both federal and state interests, the
Court elected to pursue a policy of partial pre-emption whereby the
most objectionable aspects of state regulation would be eliminated.
As stated by the Court:
In order that the recognition of legitimate state interests does
not interfere with effective administration of national labor policy
the possibility of such consequences must be minimized. We
therefore limit the availability of state remedies for libel to those
instances in which the complainant can show that the defamatory
statements were circulated with malice and caused him damage. 39
By applying the standards of N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,4" the
Court expects to guard against the abuse of defamation actions and
at the same time allow the states to pursue their own remedies in
those areas where the state interest is most pronounced.
While the Court has made a salutary effort at compromise, there
is a distinct possibility that it has underestimated the extent to which
our national policy will conflict with state action even though state
action is limited to redressing malicious and injurious defamation.
A certain amount of conflict is inevitable due to the fact that the
Linn holding leaves an overlapping area where both the NLRB and
the state courts are empowered to act. Section 8(c) of the act pro-
vides that the "expressing of any views, arguments, or opinions, or
the dissemination thereof" shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice if the expression contains "no threat of re-
prisal or force or promise of benefit."'" The NLRB has on occasion
"Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64 (1966).
"Id. at 64-65.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"LMRA § 8(c), 73 Stat. 525, 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1965).
The Court concluded that malicious libel was not immunized by section 8(c)
and suggested that "unions should adopt procedures calculated to prevent
such abuses." Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 n.5
[Vol. 45
DEFAMATION PRE-EMPTION
been called upon to determine whether alleged defamatory statements
came within the protection of this section.' Also under section
9(c), 43 the NLRB has had to determine whether statements made
during an organizational campaign were so false and misleading as
to "prevent the exercise of a free choice by employees in the elec-
tion of their bargaining representatives."4 At least in these two
situations, both the Board and the courts will entertain litigation
concerning the exact same statements, but each will be using differ-
ent procedures and effectuating different policies. The Court has,
on other occasions, recognized that the inevitable result of such con-
current jurisdiction is to produce incompatible and inconsistent hold-
ings45 which would undermine our national policy of uniform labor
relations.
4 6
Another more fundamental conflict is that by allowing state
defamation actions, the Court has now armed both parties with a
new weapon entirely alien to the statutory scheme and with abso-
lutely no relevance to the merits of the labor dispute." One has
only to look to the quality of rhetoric customarily used in labor
disputes to see how frequently libel actions would be available to
the party trying to strengthen its bargaining position. The Court
itself recognized that, "Indeed representation campaigns are fre-
quently characterized by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges,
unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, misrepre-
(1966). Compare Salzandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963), where it was held that union members were
immunized by the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations from
disciplinary actions by the union for making libelous statements about union
officers.
42 Central Massachusetts joint Bd., 131 NLRB 590. 603-04 (1959).
,
8 LMRA § 9(c), 73 Stat. 525, 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1965).
"Gummed Products Co., 112 NLRB 1092 (1955); General Shoe Corp.,
77 NLRB 124 (1948).
"'The possibility of inconsistent holdings between the Board and the
courts was pointed out in Blum v International Ass'n of Machinists, 80
N.J. Super. 37, 192 A.2d 842 (1963). In fact Linn itself expresses the
harbinger of just such a result, "When the Board and state law frown
upon the publication of malicious libel, albeit for different reasons, it may
be expected that the injured party will request both administrative and
judicial relief.... Nor would the courts and the Board act as cross pur-
poses since, as we have seen, their policies would not be inconsistent." 383
U.S. at 66-67.
'
8 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43
(1959).
, The "six-figure" damage suit has become a popular weapon to scare
off union organizing attempts in unorganized areas. Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 74 n.5 (1966).
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sentations and distortions." '48 As pointed out by the dissent, the
charges of lying in the principal case are "pale and anemic when
compared with the rich and colorful charges freely exchanged in the
heat of many labor disputes." 4 In this context, resort to libel suits
as an auxiliary weapon becomes a very real alternative which neither
party could afford to ignore." And for the combatants, emotionally
and financially committed to winning the immediate battle, consider-
ations of national policy are little incentive to refrain from taking
advantage of a fortuitous slip of the tongue by the opponent. Thus,
an entirely new factor beyond those provided for by Congress has
been thrown into the collective bargaining machinery which could
possibly disturb the delicate balance achieved by the act.
Perhaps the greatest defect of the Linn holding is that it leaves
the way open for local juries to respond to labor controversies with
those local prejudices and attitudes that the Garner-Weber-Garmon
line of cases and the act itself sought to isolate from national labor
relations."1 By requiring proof of malice and harm, the majority
expects to superimpose upon state decisions a rough uniformity
which will be in accord with the policies of the act. But it is sub-
18 Id. at 58.
"OId. at 70.
" The adverse effect of a threatened monetary judgment is amplified in
a hostile area where local juries often have a propensity to award excessive
damages. E.g., Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S.
701 (1963) ($25,000 compensatory damages); International Union, UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) ($10,000 compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, 29 identical suits were pending); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) ($275,437.19 compensatory and punitive
damages).
"' The situation is aggravated by the fact that the complaining party,
whether union or management, usually will have the unique ability to con-
trol the forum. See 51 CORNELL L.Q. 827 (1966). The citizenship of an
unincorporated labor union for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction is
determined by the citizenship of its members rather than the principal place
of business or the place of incorporation. United Steelworkers v. R. H.
Bouligney, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965). But Bouligney leaves intact FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) whereby an unincorporated labor organization may sue or
be sued in federal courts by the use of the class action. Salvant v. Louis-
ville & N. R.R., 83 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ky. 1949); Montgomery Ward &
Co., v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948). If the complaining party
wants to be in federal court, he will utilize the class action device to create
diversity jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, he prefers to be in the state
courts, he need only to sue there with the union as an entity. In effect, the
complaining party is given full opportunity to take advantage of, or avoid,
local prejudices while the defending party is largely denied the opportunity
to remove to a less partisan forum. For limitations on the use of class
actions see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (1963).
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mitted that the dissent has the more realistic view, i.e., than since
both the type of injury, caused by defamatory statements5 2 and the
malicious intent required by the Court 3 are largely subjective stan-
dards responsive to the ingenuity of trial counsel and the pre-exist-
ing attitudes of judge and jury, the outcome will probably be more
in accord with community attitudes toward unionization than with
the national labor policies.54 Those areas where union or manage-
ment5 5 will most need protection-the hostile anti-union areas of
the South or the Northern community racked by labor disturbances
-are the precise areas in which the subjective standards laid down
by the Court are of such dubious value.
Viewed from a historical perspective, the Linn decision is remi-
niscent of earlier attempts by the Court to find concurrent jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes. In Laburnum56 and Russell" the Court
attempted to allow the states to pursue traditional tort remedies
where the NLRB remedies could not effectively relieve the injured
party's plight. This experiment failed, and the Court greatly re-
stricted these holdings by its holding in Garmon. Again, in Gon-
zales the Court allowed the states to regulate intra-union disputes,
but in Borde s and Perko59 the Court greatly restricted its prior
holding. Now, several years later, the Court is again experimenting
5The Court did not in an way limit the type of harm which may be
proved and went on to enumerate what is allowable: "general injury to
reputation, consequent mental suffering, alienation of associates, specific
items of pecuniary loss, or whatever form of harm would be recognized by
state tort law." Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 65
(1966).
"
3Malice was defined as the publication of defamatory statements "with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were
true or false." Id. at 65. The dissent attributes to the Court a definition of
malice as "a deliberate intention to falsify or a malevolent desire to injure."
Id. at 70-71.
"Id. at 71.
Linn is not limited to actions against the union. "We conclude that
where either party circulates false and defamatory statements during a
union organizing campaign, the court does have jurisdiction to apply state
remedies. . . ." Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 55
(1966). For an example of a successful slander suit by a union member
against management., see Brantley v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C.
1965).
" United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
" International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
" Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690
(1963).
" Local 207, Nnt'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701
(1963).
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as it expressly recognizes, but this time it is giving fair warning
that if the experiment fails, it will be free to reconsider its holding.
Failure of the prior experiments and support from only a bare
majority for this decision indicate the likelihood that Linn will soon
be severely restricted or overruled entirely.
R. WALTON MCNAIRY, JR.
Real Property-Easements-Prescriptive Acquisition in
North Carolina
It has been said that the English law of prescription is in such
an unsatisfactory condition that no mere restatement can clear up
the confusion caused by the courts and legislature.' This statement
is equally applicable to the present situation in this country. The
combination of the lost grant theory-a fiction indulged in as a
means to cope with difficulties inherent in the common law prescrip-
tive system2-and the application of adverse possession law to pre-
17 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 352 (2d ed. 1937).
2 In early England prescription was founded on the assumption that the
right claimed had been enjoyed for a period beginning before the time of
legal memory, the date of which was fixed by statute at 1189. During the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, user for such a period was conclusive, as
evidence from before the time of legal memory could be of no avail to the
owner of the land. This doctrine resulted in great hardship on the claimant,
for as time passed, proof of user for such a long period became practically
impossible. The courts remedied this situation by devising a rule that if
proof of user was established as far back as living memory could go, it
would be presumed that it existed from 1189. This also, however, failed
to provide a satisfactory prescriptive period and in the absence of statutes
pertaining to prescriptive acquisition of incorporeal rights, the courts in-
vented a presumption of user from the time of legal memory whenever user
for a period corresponding to that required by statutes of limitation could
be shown. This method also caused much difficulty, for when the statutory
period was reduced to twenty years, the presumption was often rebutted by
proof that the user originated after 1189, although it had persisted for the
twenty year period. By the eighteenth century English judges began to
think it absurd that although twenty years enjoyment sufficed for the acquisi-
tion of a corporeal right, enjoyment since 1189 had to be shown before the
claimant could acquire an easement in respect to the same corporeal body.
Thus the courts resorted to a legal fiction founded on the medieval idea
that every prescriptive title is based on a presumed grant made before the be-
ginning of legal memory. Through this fiction of the lost grant the courts
presumed from long user and exercise of right by the claimant with acquies-
cence of the owner, that there must have originally been a grant of the
right which had become lost in modern times, i.e., after 1189. By analogy
to the statute of limitations the prescriptive period was set at twenty years.
This fiction successfully fulfilled its purpose as it destroyed the effect of
proof of user beginning within the time of legal memory. It was in this
form and with this background that the lost grant doctrine was ushered
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